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correspondence, including 133 previously unpublished (though not all those previously
published appeared in full). In this setting of an intense emotional attachment, Freud had the
confidence to let his thoughts go, to allow prejudice, intuition, and imagination, as well as
evidence and argument, to construct theory from his patients, current psychopathology,
and-perhaps especially-his own emotional life. Since these letters cover the great moments
of psychoanalysis's self-creation, they are indeed almost without rival as a record of
intellectual creativity. There is also humour, some intended and some not, and many intimate
touches about family life.
In his introduction, Masson states he has "avoided the temptation to speculate or to
interpret" in his annotations. Whether he has indeed done this, particularly in the light of his
very strongly held view about Freud's lack ofintellectual integrity over the seduction theory of
the origin of neuroses (argued in The assault on truth: Freud's suppression ofthe seduction
theory, 1984), has been seriously questioned by Sander Gilman ('Dubious relations', London
Review ofBooks, 7: no. 11., 20 June 1985). I think it is still unclear whether the publication of
all ofFreud's letters will substantially alter our understanding ofthe origins ofpsychoanalysis.
There is already considerable disagreement about how to read what was published earlier. To
interpret letters, where expression is complicated by all the idiosyncracies of personality,
mood, pressures of time, sub-texts of intention or emotion, and sheer play, is an
extraordinarily difficult matter. Freud and Fliess also drew upon a great range of medical and
psychological literature, not to mention their experiences with patients in cultural settings
quite remote from our own. Being fascinated and stimulated by the letters is one thing; using
them to reconstruct a single, persuasive account of some "real" way in which psychoanalysis
was created is another. Certainly, the letters do not speak for themselves, and any annotation
beyond the formal identification of factual references must be considered interpretative.
The letters should finally confirm that Fliess was much more than just a convenient recipient
for the more brilliant Freud's overflowing intellectual and medical ambitions. Freud needed
Fliess emotionally; but, in ways that are difficult for us to recapture (not only because of
Fliess's missing letters, but also because we are unwilling to accept how far Freud was a man of
his time and place), he needed him intellectually.
Roger Smith
University of Lancaster
MARTIN S. PERNICK, A calculus of suffering. Pain, professionalism and anesthesia in
nineteenth-century America, New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, 8vo, pp. xv, 421,
illus., $45.50.
This mild-mannered book takes on the iconoclastic task of placing the introduction of
anaesthesia, the "triumph over pain", within the social and professional context of
mid-nineteenth-century American medicine. In the process, anaesthesia is displaced from its
once heroic role as a leading indicator of medical progress to become one more mediator of
intraprofessional conflict and professional authority. Pernick uses the debate overanaesthesia
for a careful exploration of value conflicts within a divided medical profession. While heroic
practitioners and naturalistic healers both, if for different reasons, tended to avoid
anaesthesia, conservative physicians developed a new utilitarian ethic, a balancing ofthe costs
(the dangers of anaesthetics) and the benefits (the relief of pain) in each individual case.
Pernick presents the conservative synthesis-the "calculus of suffering'-as a compromise
position that permitted the judicious use of anaesthetics while preserving and enhancing the
professional status of the surgeons.
Pernick's argument is an endorsement of moderation in both medical behaviour and
historical interpretation. Ifanything, he seems overly generous to thesurgeonsbyarguingthat
their actions were a result of a more or less rational calculus: to this reviewer, they seemed
rather to be "muddling through" on the basis of a mix of personal experiences, social
prejudices, and professional interests. In the process, however, they collectively produced a
social hierarchy ofsensitivity topain: manlymenseldom needed anaesthesia, sensitive (white)
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women needed a little, and, more frequently, immigrants needed less than the native-born,
while black men and women had a natural immunity to pain. In general, the available surgical
records ofhospitals in the late nineteenth century show these theoretical ideas reflected in the
actual frequency of anaesthesia used for different groups of patients.
Pernick's account displays the many arguments adduced for and against anaesthesia,
including the disputed "value" ofpain, the role ofanaesthetics in changing the power relations
between physicians and patients, and the possible sexual threat to anaesthetized females.
Much more could doubtless be said about the issues of sexual dominance, unconsciousness,
and professional power; Pernick raises the issues but does not pay them extended attention.
His calculus, and the one on which he lavishes most attention, is the trade-off between the
reliefofsuffering and the (perceived) increased danger ofsurgery: at least some surgeons were
willing to accept a five per cent increase in risk of death for painless major surgery. Pernick's
evidence shows that the availability of anaesthesia did lead to an increase in surgical rates:
immediately after the discovery ofanaesthesia, the rate ofsurgery for men doubled, while that
for women tripled. (In accordance with the calculus ofsuffering, women were more likely to be
given anaesthesia than men; overall, anaesthetics made major surgery and intricate
procedures more feasible.) Pernick also argues, however, that anaesthesia probably had little
effect on the death rate from surgery and, interestingly, that rising surgical mortality was more
a function of increasing industrial and railroad accidents than of the use of anaesthetics.
This engaging account of the introduction and use of anaesthesia rests on an extensive
substructure of scholarly research. Whether the reader agrees with the precise weighting of
theoretical arguments, there can be little doubt that Pernick has placed the discovery and
application of anaesthesia at the centre of the social history of medicine, relating it clearly to
contested issues about the process of professionalization and suggesting, at least, its possible
implications for questions of class, race, and gender in relation to selective medical therapies
and professional power.
Elizabeth Fee
The Johns Hopkins University
LINDA L. CLARK, Social Darwinism in France, University of Alabama Press/London,
Eurospan, 1984, 8vo, pp. xi, 261, [no price stated].
In this short volume, Dr Clark has attempted to tackle the enormously difficult problem of
the relationship of evolutionary thought to political philosophy, assessing in turn the
penetration ofsuch ideasinto Republican, leftist, and right-wingideologies inFrance. Neither
does the author stop there. She proceeds with a fast-paced discussion of the impact of such
ideas on literature, sociology, anthropology, and eugenics, as well as on colonialism and
international affairs. Her brief is undoubtedly overly ambitious: she maintains that her work
will uncover the figures most concerned with social Darwinism; how they applied the study of
biology to human society; and what relationship existed between social Darwinism and
political, economic, and cultural life. No matter how laudable the aims are, the work is
nonetheless marred by a persistent and nagging problem of definition involving conceptual
problems that hamper her interpretative framework from the start. In sum, Dr Clark never
convinces us that social evolutionary ideas in France have much to do with social Darwinism.
She quite rightly begins her volume with a discussion of definition and seeks to sort out the
various "evolutionisms" that she confronts. The first group, termed "social Darwinist",
emphasizes the "struggle for life", race competition, and the legitimation of laissez-faire
economics. The next two categories she terms "reform Darwinists" and "social
Lamarckians"; it is not clear, however, from her succeeding analysis what the difference
between these two groups is, as both stress the importance of "association" and
"co-operation" over "struggle" and "competition". Moreover, the first category raises
innumerable interpretative difficulties to which the authorherselfalludes, the mostsignificant
beingthat social Darwinism isnot "arigorouslydeveloped set ofargumentsframedby Darwin
himself for or by his authorised representatives". Because of this lack of coherent and
233